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Bank Secrecy Laws: An American
Perspective
G. Philip Rutledge*
I. Introduction
Bank secrecy laws are a species of financial privacy laws whose
purpose is to establish statutory obligations and duties between a
banker and his customer. Other species of financial privacy laws
include structural banking forms and impediments and blocking
statutes.' Structural banking forms and impediments include use of
"anonymous (also known as numbered) accounts and accounts held
under false names.' An anonymous account is used when an
account holder signs an agreement with a personal bank agent
agreeing to the conditions of the relationship and receives a
number or pseudonym."
Structural forms are intended to protect the customer by
insulating bank employees who may be the target of inquiries or
bribes from third parties seeking the identity of the account
holder.3 Trust and corporate structures also obfuscate financial
transactions since a trust can include either an individual or a
corporate fiduciary holding assets in its own name or for a
beneficiary.4 Combining a trust with a confidential account creates
additional layers of anonymity.'
Statutes known as "blocking laws" are used to prohibit the
disclosure, inspection, or removal of documents located in one
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1. See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion over Comity: The United States' Assault
on Foreign Bank Secrecy, 12 NW. J. INT'L & Bus. 454 (1992).
2. Id. at 459.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 460.
5. Id.
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country in compliance with the orders of another country.6
Generally, there are two types of blocking laws. One "prohibits
production of documents or testimony before a foreign tribunal."7
The second type of blocking law "prohibits substantive compliance
with foreign government orders."' While bank secrecy laws are
designed to protect banking relationships, blocking laws are not
uncommon in bank secrecy jurisdictions since they are used to
impede legal discovery techniques.9
This article, however, is intended to focus primarily on bank
secrecy laws. Some nations have enacted bank secrecy laws to
provide an international safe haven for the assets of individuals
persecuted by oppressive political regimes in their home countries.
Developing countries faced with capital flight and lack of hard
currency have adopted bank secrecy laws as an economic develop-
ment measure.10 Additionally, bank secrecy jurisdictions may
provide an incentive by imposing zero or low rates of tax on
foreign funds held in a jurisdiction. 1 Hence, bank secrecy laws
often reflect deeply held traditions or the embodiment of national
economic objectives.
Regardless of motivation, bank secrecy laws are all designed
to provide institutional legal protection for the relationship between
the banker and the client. 2 This often is accomplished by
criminalizing the act of revealing information obtained in the
course of such a relationship." Exceptions generally are narrow
and permitted only when the requirements of domestic law
supersede the policy goal of the bank secrecy statute.14 To
engender compliance, breaches of the statutory duties imposed by
bank secrecy statutes carry stiff penalties. 5
Recently, there has been movement to persuade those
countries with bank secrecy laws to waive secrecy provisions and to
6. Jones, supra note 1, at 462.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 464.
10. Id. at 456.
11. Jones, supra note 1, at 462.
12. Id. at 461.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 462.
15. Id.; Bundesgesetz uber die Banker und Sparkassen of Nov. 8, 1934
(Banking Law of 1934) [hereinafter Swiss Bank Secrecy Law], implemented in
Verordnung of May 17, 1972 (Ordinance), and Vollziehungsrerordnung of Aug.
30, 1961 (Implementing Ordinance) (referring to article 47 of the 1934 Banking
Law which has penalties of $35,000 or_$21,000).
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permit the release of banking information as part of an internation-
al effort to combat the laundering of money obtained through
criminal activity.16 While some countries have modified their bank
secrecy laws to permit the release of information in the case of
laundering drug money, these amendments have not been broad-
ened to include illicit profits from insider dealing, tax evasion,
terrorist activities, or other criminal enterprises.1 7 In addition, the
information only may be requested or obtained by a domestic
authority which leaves some doubt as to the efficacy of these
changes with respect to requests for information from foreign
governments. A key element in the effort to ease secrecy laws is
to convince the bank secrecy jurisdiction that participating in a
conspiracy to facilitate money laundering is more damaging to its
national interest than the economic benefit bestowed by retaining
absolute bank secrecy laws.
The individual right to privacy is enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution and is articulated in a number of international human
rights agreements. 8 Should not the individual right to privacy
extend to one's financial affairs with appropriate laws to protect the
confidentiality of private financial transactions? At first blush, it
appears that the United States, in several respects, extends such
confidentiality. 9
First, U.S. common law on the contractual relationship
between a banker and his client follows the English decision in
Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England.'
The Tournier case held that a banker owed a client an implied
contractual duty to its customer not to disclose customer informa-
tion to third parties except when: (1) disclosures are required by
law; (2) there is a duty to the public to disclose; (3) the interests of
the bank require disclosure; or (4) disclosure is made with the
16. Ostvogles, Luxembourg Banking Secrecy Law, 21 INT'L Bus. LAW. 367
(1993).
17. Id. at 368.
18. U.S.C.A. Const. amend. 4 (1791); The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N.Doc. A/A to 10, at art. 12 (1948);
European Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 8 x (1), Council of Europe, Eur. T.S. No. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 211 (1954).
19. See Berta E. Hernandez, RIP to IRP - Money Laundering and Drug
Traffic Controls Score a Knockout Victory over Bank Secrecy, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 235 (1993).
20. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union Bank of England, 1 K.B. 461
(1924).
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express or implied consent of the customer.21 Second, a federal
law known as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)22 and third, a federal
law known as the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) z also
exist.
As will be shown, the BSA has built upon the exceptions in
Tournier and the RFPA. The BSA generally requires notification
to bank customers of government requests for financial records and
mandates, in certain instances, that financial institutions not reveal
to its customers that their records are being reviewed. Further-
more, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit civil discovery
of private financial information provided that the information
sought (1) is not privileged and (2) is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action.24
While some countries enacted bank secrecy legislation that has
imposed specific statutory duties on the banker-client relationship
and attached criminal penalties for breaches of those duties, the
United States has taken a very different view toward the banker-
client relationship and the client's use of the U.S. banking system.
The view of the United States was fostered by evidence presented
to the U.S. Congress' that mandatory reporting of certain
financial transactions by financial institutions was crucial in the
fight against organized and white collar crime. The House of
Representatives Report on the BSA provided, in part:
Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial
institutions have permitted proliferation of 'white collar' crime;
have served as the financial underpinning of organized criminal
operations in the United States; have served as the ultimate
depository of black market proceeds from Vietnam; have served
as a source of questionable financing for conglomerate and
other corporate stock acquisitions, mergers and takeovers; have
covered conspiracies to steal from U.S. defense and foreign aid
funds; and have served as the cleaning agent for 'hot' or
illegally obtained monies.26
The BSA requires that a domestic U.S. financial institution27
21. Id.
22. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1730d (repealed 1989), 1951-59 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
23. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
26. Id
27. A "domestic U.S. financial institution" includes each agent, agency, branch
or office within the U.S. of a bank (including U.S. branches and agencies of
foreign banks); a broker or dealer in securities; a currency dealer or exchanger
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file a report with the U.S. Treasury Department within 15 days of
when it is involved in a transaction for the payment, receipt, or
transfer of U.S. currency or other monetary instruments28 totalling
more than $10,000.29 In addition, currency or monetary instru-
ments taken in or out of the U.S. exceeding $10,000 must be
reported, in addition to, transactions above certain amounts
involving foreign bank accounts. 30
The BSA makes it an offense for any person, for the purpose
of evading these reporting requirements, to cause or attempt to
cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a required report
or to file a required report that contains a material omission or
misstatement of fact.31 It is also an offense for any person, for the
purpose of evading these reporting requirements, to structure or
assist in structuring, or to attempt to structure or assist in structur-
ing, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institu-
tions.3
2
The failure of domestic financial institutions to comply with
the reporting requirements of the BSA may result in substantial
penalties.33 For a willful violation of any recordkeeping require-
ment by a domestic financial institution, the Treasury Secretary
may assess the institution and any partner, director, officer, or
employee thereof who willfully participated in the violation a civil
monetary penalty not exceeding $1,000.' For a willful violation
of the BSA reporting requirement itself by a domestic financial
institution or any partner, director, officer, or employee thereof, the
(including check cashers); an issuer, seller or redeemer of travellers checks or
money orders (except those who sell less than $150,000 in a 30 day period); a
licensed transmitter of funds; a telegraph company; a casino or gambling casino
having annual gross revenues in excess of $1 million; the U.S. Postal Service, with
respect to the sale of money orders; and any person subject to supervision by any
state or federal bank supervisory authority.
28. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996). "Monetary instruments"
include currency; travellers checks in any form; all negotiable instruments
(including personal checks, official bank checks, cashier's checks, promissory notes
and money orders) that either are in bearer form, endorsed without restriction or
otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery; incomplete
instruments signed but with the payee's name omitted; and securities or stock in
bearer form or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery.
29. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5316(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
30. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5313, 5316 (West 1983).
31. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 5317, 5321 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
32. Id. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
33. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321 (West 1993); 31 C.F.R. § 103.47 (1995).
34. Id. 31 C.F.R. § 103.47(a) (West 1995). See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5321
(West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
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violation shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than the
greater of the amount involved in the transaction (not to exceed
$100,000) or $25,000.31 The Treasury Secretary may also impose
a civil monetary penalty of not more than $500 against any
domestic financial institution which negligently -violates any
provision of the reporting requirements.36
The BSA also contains criminal penalties.37 A person who
willfully violates any Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting
Act (CFTA) provisions of the BSA or any regulation prescribed
thereunder may be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned for
not more than five years, or both. A person who willfully
violates any provision of the CFTA, or any regulation prescribed
thereunder while violating another law of the United States or as
part of a pattern of any illegal activity involving more than
$100,000 in a 12 month period may be fined not more than
$500,000, imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both.39
A person who knowingly makes any false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statements or representations in any report required to
be filed under the CFTA may be fined an amount not to exceed
$10,000, imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.' More
recent legislation provides that the government may terminate the
authority of a financial institution to do business in the United
States, may terminate a state bank's coverage under federal deposit
insurance, or prohibit a foreign bank from operating an agency,
branch, or commercial lending subsidiary if it is convicted of a
criminal violation under the BSA.4
The constitutionality of these BSA reporting requirements was
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in California Bankers Associa-
tion v. Schultz.4 2 In Schultz, the Court concluded that mere
maintenance of records by banks under the Treasury Secretary's
regulations did not constitute a seizure.43 The U.S. Supreme
35. Id. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(5)(B)(ii) (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
36. Id. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5321(6) (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
37. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995); 31 C.F.R. §103.49 (1995).
38. Id. 31 C.F.R. § 103.49(b) (1995). See also 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a) (West
1983 & Supp. 1995).
39. Id. 31 C.F.R. § 103.49(2) (1995). See generally 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322 (West
1983 & Supp. 1995).
40. Id. 31 C.F.R. § 103.49(d) (1995). See also 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322 (West 1983
& Supp. 1995).
41. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 93, 1818, 9305 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
42. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
43. Id.
PERSPECrIVES ON BANK SECRECY
Court, in US. v. Miller,' decided that the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures did not apply to
records held under the BSA. In Miller, the Court explained that
the records of the depositor's account were business records of the
bank and not the private papers of the depositor. Thus, the
depositor could assert neither ownership nor possession in a claim
of illegal seizure.45
Having established the statutory requirements in the BSA and
having overcome the constitutional challenges presented by the
previously mentioned cases, the authority of the U.S. Treasury
Department requiring domestic financial institutions to provide
reports on specified financial transactions is unquestioned.'
While the banking community continues to claim that the reporting
requirements are onerous and extremely costly, the U.S. Govern-
ment asserts that such controls and reporting are necessary to
prevent criminal enterprises from using the United States' banking
system.47
Eight years after enacting the BSA, Congress passed the
RFPA. The RFPA was advertised as an attempt to restrict
government access to the private banking information of individu-
als." While most Americans probably believe that their financial
information is confidential and protected from government
intrusion by the RFPA, in reality, the RFPA only requires that the
financial institution notify its customer prior to providing the
banking information that the government has requested. In some
instances, the RFPA requires them not to notify their customers of
the government's request.49
The premise of the RFPA was that the customer would be
given notice so that he would have the opportunity to challenge the
government's request.5" In order to challenge the government's
access to his records, a customer must show some factual basis
supporting an allegation that the records are not being sought for
a legitimate purpose. The government, however, has the burden of
proof that it is justified in receiving the requested records.51
44. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
45. Id.
46. See Hernandez, supra note 19.
47. See Jones, supra note 1, at 457.
48. See Hernandez, supra note 19.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3405, 3410 (West 1989).
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Under the RFPA, the government may obtain access to
financial records by: (1) the written consent of the customer; (2)
a search warrant; (3) an administrative subpoena issued by a
government agency;52 (4) a formal written request;53 (5) a judicial
subpoena; or (6) a grand jury subpoena.' These prerequisites do
not apply when the bank elects to provide information voluntarily
to government authorities upon suspicion of a violation of law
inferred from records in its custody."
Under the exception, banks may provide the name of the
account holder, the account number in question, the nature of the
suspected illegal activity, and whatever additional information may
be necessary for law enforcement authorities to determine if an
offense has been committed or to initiate an investigation.
Reporting suspected criminal activity does not make a bank liable
to those suspected of such activity.
56
Amendments to the RFPA contained in the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
prohibit a financial institution from notifying any person named in
a grand jury subpoena about the subpoena." The amendments
also authorize the government to apply for a court order to delay
the required RFPA notice to the customer 58 A specific delay of
notification is permitted when there is reason to believe that
52. For instance, the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC), which
is an administrative agency, is authorized under Section 21(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to obtain financial records of persons without prior notice
pursuant to an administrative subpoena when the SEC has reason to believe that
(1) a delay in obtaining access to such financial records or the required notice will
result in flight from prosecution, destruction of evidence, transfer of assets or
records outside the territorial limits of the United States, improper conversion of
investor assets or impeding the ability of the SEC to identify or trace the source
or disposition of funds involved in any securities transaction; (2) such financial
records are necessary to identify or trace the record or beneficial ownership
interest in any security; (3) the acts, practices or course of conduct under
investigation involve the dissemination of materially false or misleading
information concerning any security, issuer, or market or the failure to make
disclosures required under the securities laws, which remain uncorrected or a
financial loss to investors or other persons protected under the securities laws
which remains substantially uncompensated; or (4) the acts, practices or course of
conduct under investigation involve significant financial speculation in securities
or endanger the stability of any financial or investment intermediary.
53. 12 U.S.C. § 3408 (West 1989). This is used where government authorities
seek information but are not authorized by law to issue administrative subpoenas.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 3409 (West 1989).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c), § 3417(c) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 3420(b)(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
58. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3409(a) (West 1989).
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notification would result in: (1) endangerment of a person's life;
(2) flight from prosecution; (3) destruction or tampering with
evidence; (4) intimidation of witnesses; or (5) placing an investiga-
tion in serious jeopardy."
Under the RFPA, there are four situations where the notifica-
tion requirements do not apply'6  First, RFPA does not apply
when the records are being sought in connection with a judicial
proceeding in which the government and customer are a party.61
Second, no notification is required if the bank is merely being
asked to provide basic account information such as a name, type of
account, and account number.6 2 Third, authorized foreign intelli-
gence investigations and secret service functions are permitted
access to records of customers of financial institutions without
notifying such customers.' Lastly, government access to customer
information without notification can be obtained in emergency
situations where delay would create imminent danger of physical
injury, serious property damage, or flight from prosecution.64
A major source of international conflict in the bank secrecy
area has been over the efforts exerted by U.S. government
agencies, particularly the SEC, to obtain financial records from
bank secrecy jurisdictions. Recent memoranda of understanding 5
and federal legislation amending the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act) have created a better atmosphere for international
cooperation in the investigation of cross-border crime and the
tracing of proceeds derived from illicit activities.
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 enacted a new Section 21(a)(2) to the 1934 Act which
authorizes the SEC to provide assistance to foreign securities
authorities.' The SEC, upon request of a foreign securities
59. These provisions apply to individuals and partnerships of less .han five
persons. Id.
60. 12 U.S.C.A. § 3413 (West 1989).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(h) - (i) (West 1989).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(g) (West 1989).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a) (West 1989).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(b)(1) (West 1989).
65. The 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and
Switzerland on the exchange of information in investigations of insider dealing,
money laundering and other crimes provides for procedures to collect information
under the 1977 Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the
Swiss Confederation and the United States. See 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 1729
(Nov. 13, 1987); Jill E. Asch, Bank Secrecy: A Barrier to the Prosecution of Insider
Trading, 4 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 185 (1990).
66. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-74, 102 Stat. 4677 (1989).
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authority, may provide assistance if the requesting authority states
that it is conducting an investigation necessary to determine
whether a person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate
any laws or rules relating to securities matters that the requesting
authority administers or enforces. If necessary, the SEC may
conduct its own investigation to collect information and evidence
pertinent to the request for assistance.67
It is important to note that the SEC is permitted to provide
assistance without regard to whether the facts stated in the request
of the foreign securities authority would also constitute a violation
of United States law. Therefore, in the spirit of reciprocity, the
SEC can offer foreign authorities access to financial information in
the United States in an effort to obtain similar levels of coopera-
tion when the SEC makes an assistance request to the foreign
authority.
In this regard, however, foreign jurisdictions have always been
concerned about the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
which requires mandatory disclosure of information held by
government agencies. 6 This concern was addressed in the enact-
ment of section 24(d) to the 1934 Act as part of the International
Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990.69 Under this
provision, the SEC shall not be compelled, pursuant to the FOIA,
to disclose records obtained from a foreign securities authority if
changed to conform to internal consistency (1) the foreign securities
authority has in good faith determined and represented to the SEC
that public disclosure of such records would violate the laws
applicable to that foreign securities authority and (2) the SEC
obtains the records pursuant to a memorandum of understanding
or any procedure available to it for the administration and
enforcement of the United States securities laws.7"
Despite a law entitled the Bank Secrecy Act, there is no bank
secrecy in the United States in the traditional sense. While the
Supreme Court reminds that there can be no constitutional
expectation of privacy in banking transactions in the United States,
the popular notion among Americans is that normal, everyday
banking transactions are not usually the subject of government
67. See G. Philip Rutledge, Insider Conflicts in Japan and the US, in THE
FIDUCIARY, THE INSIDER AND THE CONFLICT 159 (Sweet Maxwell Brehon eds.,
1995).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
70. Id.
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inquiries. Yet, Americans should realize that if the government
wants personal financial information, it generally can obtain the
information it requires.
II. Conclusion
The essence of the U.S. approach to the banking system may
be characterized as contractual. The government seeks to maintain
a safe and sound banking system for the benefit of its citizens who,
in exchange for participating in the system and enjoying its benefits,
implicitly authorize the government to take necessary steps to
obtain information which will prevent the abuse of the banking
system by criminal enterprises. The United States government also
has been willing to impose upon the nation's financial institutions,
under threat of substantial civil and criminal penalties, the cost of
operating a sophisticated financial reporting system which it has
deemed essential to safeguard the domestic banking system from
misuse by criminal organizations.
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